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ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB’S
FREEDOM CLUB PAC V. BENNETT:
MONEY TALKS, MATCHING
FUNDS PROVISION WALKS
Roya Rahmanpour*
Money’s influence on politics has posed a problem for many
jurisdictions. Arizona tried to combat this issue in part through the
“matching funds” provision of its Clean Elections Act. This provision
was part of a larger campaign-financing scheme; it allowed for
additional campaign money to go to publicly financed candidates when
the expenditures of their privately financed opponents and other
independent groups collectively exceeded the initial funding that the
state had provided to the publicly financed candidates. In Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that this matching funds provision violated the First
Amendment. This Comment examines the Court’s ruling and argues that
the Court’s disregard of empirical evidence, narrowing of the
acceptable compelling state interests, and prioritization of individual
speech over societal interests could lead to unprincipled decisions in
the field of campaign finance and could cause campaign-finance
deregulation. It further argues that the decision’s myopic analytic
approach could bring about the piecemeal invalidation of intricate
public-financing schemes and adversely impact policy decisions.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S. Biology, June 2008,
University of California, Los Angeles. My deepest gratitude to Professor Jessica A. Levinson for
her guidance on this Comment and beyond; to Jason Campbell and Edith Nazarian for their
invaluable feedback on early drafts; and to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their meticulous edits. Finally, a special thank you to my family for their moral
support and ongoing encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the adage goes, “Money talks.” And money, in the context of
political campaigns, is a form of speech that the First Amendment
protects.1 In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett,2 the U.S. Supreme Court considered this First Amendment
right as applied to the “matching funds” provision of Arizona’s
Clean Elections Act (the “Act”). This provision granted additional
campaign money to publicly financed candidates when the
expenditures of their privately financed opponents and other
independent groups collectively exceeded the initial funding that the
state had provided to the publicly financed candidates.3 The fivemember majority of the strongly divided Court held that this
matching funds scheme violated the First Amendment.4
This decision, which addressed the constitutionality of Arizona’s
matching funds provision and the bounds of permissible public
financing more generally, is an important addition to campaignfinance jurisprudence for several reasons. First, Arizona Free
Enterprise resolves a substantial circuit split regarding whether
schemes like Arizona’s violate the First Amendment.5 Moreover,
Arizona Free Enterprise marks the first case in which the Court has
struck down a matching funds provision and is thus of great
precedential value.6 As precedent, the decision renders other
jurisdictions’ matching funds provisions and clean election laws

1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). The Court consolidated this case with McComish v. Bennett.
3. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2816 (deciding the constitutionality of ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-952 (2011)).
4. Id. at 2813.
5. Compare McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), N.C. Right to Life Comm.
Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008), and Daggett v.
Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (each
holding that matching funds to publicly financed candidates based on contributions and
expenditures for privately financed candidates do not violate the First Amendment), with Scott v.
Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010), Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir.
2010), and Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (each holding similar laws
unconstitutional).
6. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Union for Reform Judaism in Support of Respondents at 17,
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. 2806 (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), 2011 WL 661704, at *17.
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more susceptible to constitutional attack.7 Moreover, the decision,
which invalidated a key provision of the Arizona law, eliminates a
workable public-financing model that other jurisdictions could have
followed.8
Part II of this Comment briefly summarizes the facts and
procedural history of Arizona Free Enterprise. Part III then details
the Court’s reasoning in arriving at its holding. Next, Part IV
analyzes the decision by arguing that the Court’s disregard of
empirical evidence, narrowing of the permissible compelling state
interest, and prioritization of individual speech over societal interests
can lead to campaign-financing deregulation and yield unprincipled
decisions in the area of campaign-finance law. Part IV also argues
that this decision’s myopic analytic approach leads to piecemeal
invalidation of intricate public financing schemes and adversely
impacts policy decisions.
II. BACKGROUND OF
ARIZONA LAW AND
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Arizona Clean Elections Act implemented a completely
voluntary public-financing system to fund the election campaigns of
candidates for state office.9 Candidates who chose to participate
(“publicly financed candidates”) were granted an initial allotment of
public funds in exchange for accepting certain campaign restrictions
and obligations.10 The state also granted participating candidates
additional matching funds if the combined expenditures of their
privately financed opponents and of other independent groups that
supported the privately financed opponents exceeded the state’s
7. See, e.g., Melissa Griffin, San Francisco Election Financing Needs to Change, THE
EXAMINER (June 28, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/06/san-franciscoelection-financing-needs-change (explaining that in light of this case, San Francisco’s campaign
financing system will have to change).
8. Through this decision “the U.S. Supreme Court took away the power of lawmakers on
all levels of government to craft public campaign financing programs that best meet their needs.”
Jessica A. Levinson, Justices Strike Down ‘Rescue Funds’ Provision in Public Campaign
Financing Laws, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, LOY. L. SCH., L.A. FAC. BLOG (July 1, 2011),
http://llsblog.lls.edu/faculty/2011/07/justices-strike-down-rescue-funds-provision-in-publiccampaign-financing-laws.html#more.
9. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813.
10. Id. at 2814 (referring to ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-941(A), -956(A)(2) (2006))
(stating that “publicly funded candidates” must agree to limit their expenditure of personal funds,
participate in one debate, and adhere to an overall spending cap).
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initial allotment to the participating candidates.11 The state issued
these additional matching funds at a ratio of ninety-four cents for
every dollar that the privately financed candidates and independent
expenditure groups spent.12 The state capped matching funds to
publicly financed candidates at three times13 the initial state
allotment, at which point it stopped providing further matching funds
even while it still required the participating candidate to refrain from
private fundraising.14 Thus, a candidate who was able to raise funds
in excess of three times the amount of a publicly financed
candidate’s initial grant gained a potentially unlimited financial
advantage by opting out of public funding.15
Five past and future political candidates and two independent
expenditure groups challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s
matching funds provision, arguing that the provision violated their
First Amendment rights; they claimed that their fear of triggering
matching funds to their publicly financed opponents caused them to
curb their campaign fundraising or spending and therefore chilled
their speech.16 The district court struck down the matching funds
provision, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
provision imposed a minimal burden on speech and was justified by
Arizona’s interest in curbing quid pro quo political corruption.17 The
Supreme Court reversed again, holding that Arizona’s matching
funds scheme violated the First Amendment rights of privately
financed candidates and independent expenditure groups because it
substantially burdened political speech and was not sufficiently
justified by a compelling state interest.18

11. Id.
12. Id. (noting that the six-percent deduction accounts for the privately financed candidate’s
fundraising expenses).
13. The Court mistakenly wrote that the state capped matching funds at two times the
allotment, but section 16-952(E) makes clear that the cap is three times the allotment. § 16952(E); Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825.
14. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2814–15.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2816.
17. McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 2292213 (D. Ariz.), rev’d
sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
18. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
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III. REASONING
OF THE COURT
A. The Majority’s Reasoning
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, struck down Arizona’s matching funds provision,
first by finding that the provision severely burdened protected
political speech—necessitating application of strict scrutiny—and
then by determining that the provision was not justified by a
compelling state interest.19
1. Whether the Matching Fund Provision
Imposed a Substantial Burden on
Privately Financed Candidates’ Speech
The majority relied heavily on Davis v. FEC20 in deciding that
the matching funds provision substantially burdened protected
speech.21 Davis involved a First Amendment challenge to the
“Millionaire’s Amendment” of the federal Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, which called for an asymmetrical regulatory scheme if a
candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives spent more than
$350,000 of his personal funds.22 Under that asymmetrical scheme,
when a candidate spent more than $350,000 of his personal funds,
his opponent could collect individual contributions that amounted to
three times the normal contribution limit.23 The Court in Davis found
that the scheme burdened the self-funded candidate’s First
Amendment rights because his expenditure of personal funds in
excess of $350,000 enabled his opponent to raise more money and
counteract his speech.24
Likewise, the Arizona Free Enterprise majority reasoned that
Arizona’s matching funds provision burdened speech because the
privately financed candidate’s choice to raise or spend more than the
state’s initial grant to his opponent publicly financed candidate
triggered a state grant of additional funds to his opponent.25 The
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
554 U.S. 724 (2008).
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817–18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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majority then characterized the matching funds provision as a
“penalty” that was constitutionally more problematic than the law in
Davis26 was because (1) an outright grant of matching funds was
more burdensome than a raising of the contribution limits for one of
the candidates was; (2) the matching funds provision could have
created a multiplier effect in elections with multiple publicly
financed candidates; and (3) the triggering of the matching funds
may have been out of the privately financed candidate’s control
because spending by independent expenditure groups could have also
triggered matching funds.27
Additionally, the majority determined that independent
expenditure groups’ speech was burdened even more than that of
privately financed candidates because these independent expenditure
groups did not have the option of participating in Arizona’s public
financing scheme.28 According to the majority, the Act burdened
these groups by forcing them to choose among triggering a grant of
matching funds, changing their message, or not speaking.29
In the remainder of its burden analysis, the majority defended its
reasoning in light of the dissent’s criticism.30 Countering the
dissent’s view that the matching funds provision actually fostered
more speech,31 the majority stated that any increased speech came at
the expense of the privately financed candidate.32 The majority also
stated that a privately financed candidate’s willingness to trigger the
state’s grant of matching funds to his opponent did not make the law
any less burdensome.33 As to the dissent’s evidentiary concern, the
majority replied that proving a negative (i.e., that speech had been
chilled) was not easy and cited Davis for the proposition that no
empirical evidence was needed to determine that the law was
burdensome.34 Finally, the majority reasoned that the constitutional
infirmity of the provision was not the amount of funding that was
triggered but rather the manner in which funding was triggered—

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 2818–19.
Id. at 2819–20.
Id.
Id. at 2820–24.
See infra Part III.B.1.
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2821.
Id. at 2823.
Id.
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namely that it was triggered in response to the speech of privately
financed candidates or independent expenditure groups.35
2. Whether a Compelling State Interest
Justified the Matching Funds Provision
Because the majority held that the Act imposed a substantial
burden on protected speech, the majority applied strict scrutiny,
which requires a compelling state interest to justify a law.36 The
majority accepted the challengers’ contention that the matching
funds provision impermissibly sought to equalize electoral
opportunities rather than further the state’s alleged compelling
interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.37 It
found the operation of the provision and its legislative terminology
of “equalizing funds” as evidence that the Act was an attempt to
level the electoral playing field.38
The majority further doubted that the Act had an anticorruption
rationale because a candidate’s use of personal funds, without
outside influence, also triggered a grant of matching funds.39 Finally,
the majority expressed doubt about whether the matching funds
provision provided any additional anticorruption value by noting that
Arizona already had fundraising disclosure requirements and
contribution limits that aimed to deter corruption.40 Thus, the Court
held that Arizona’s matching funds provision was not justified by a
compelling state interest and was therefore unconstitutional.41
B. The Dissent’s Reasoning
Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined in a
vigorous dissent in which they argued that the Act’s matching funds
provision did not burden protected speech or that it was justified by
the state’s compelling anticorruption interest.42 Before delving into

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 2824.
Id.
Id. at 2825.
Id.
Id. at 2826.
Id. at 2827.
Id. at 2828–29.
Id. at 2829 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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their constitutional analysis, the dissenters first discussed the virtues
and mechanics of Arizona’s public-funding scheme.43
According to the dissent, Arizona’s political history revealed
how ineffective contribution limits and disclosure requirements were
in eliminating corruption; even with those regulations, the state
suffered “AzScam,” one of the worst corruption scandals in Arizona
history, where authorities caught nearly ten percent of the state’s
legislators accepting bribes for political favors.44 As a result, the state
enacted the public-funding scheme on top of its existing contribution
limits and disclosure requirements.45 To make the scheme effective,
Arizona crafted a “Goldilocks solution” to set the matching fund
amount; the legislature set matching fund limits high enough in order
to assure participating candidates that they could run competitive
races, but not so high as to waste taxpayer dollars.46 Thus, after
discussing the matching funds provision, the dissent moved on to
analyze the provision’s constitutionality.47
1. Whether the Matching Fund Provision
Imposed a Substantial Burden on
Privately Financed Candidates’ Speech
As the dissent stated, not only did the provision not burden
protected speech but it also “subsidize[d] and so produce[d] more
political speech.”48 The dissent noted that speech restrictions differ
from speech subsidies and explained that “government subsidies of
speech are consistent with the First Amendment so long as they do
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.”49 Since Arizona offered
its public-financing program to all candidates regardless of their
viewpoints, the dissent found no First Amendment violation.50 It
explained that “Arizona . . . offers to support any person running for
state office. Petitioners here refused that assistance. So they were
making a novel argument: that Arizona violated their First

43. Id. at 2830–31.
44. Id. at 2832.
45. Id.
46. Id. (describing the matching funds provision as an optimal means of calibrating public
funds at just the right amount).
47. Id. at 2833.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2834.
50. Id. at 2834–35.
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Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even
though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the same
financial assistance.”51 Indeed, the dissent was outraged that the
challengers to the law were essentially demanding a right to speak
free from response.52
Citing the seminal campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo,53 the
dissent also articulated that the majority was misguided in holding
that a subsidy of electoral speech constituted a restraint on speech.54
According to the dissent, a viewpoint-neutral subsidy of additional,
responsive speech has never been seen as a First Amendment burden
and is certainly not a “substantial” burden.55 Any burden that the
matching funds provision imposed was no greater than the burden
that is imposed by (1) a lump-sum public financing scheme; (2)
disclosure and disclaimer requirements; or (3) contribution limits—
all of which the Court had previously upheld.56
Additionally, the dissent distinguished Davis, which was the
linchpin case in the majority’s reasoning.57 In Davis, the candidate’s
expenditure triggered a “discriminatory speech restriction,” but in
Arizona Free Enterprise, the candidate’s expenditure triggered a
“non-discriminatory speech subsidy.”58 Furthermore, the dissent
noted that Davis never called into question the trigger mechanism
itself, but rather questioned the discriminatory speech restriction that
the mechanism brought about.59 By distinguishing Davis, the dissent
reiterated that Arizona’s matching fund provision did not impose a
substantial burden on protected speech.60
2. Whether a Compelling State Interest
Justified the Matching Funds Provision
The dissent alternatively maintained that, even if the matching
funds provision substantially burdened speech, it was justified by
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 2835.
Id.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2836 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2836–37.
Id. at 2837–39.
Id. at 2839–41.
Id. at 2839.
Id. at 2840.
Id. at 2839–41.

1).
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Arizona’s anticorruption rationale.61 Campaign-finance precedent
squarely acknowledges the prevention of corruption or its appearance
as a compelling state interest.62
As evidence of the anticorruption interest that Arizona claimed,
the dissent found instructive the formal findings of the public
financing statute, which stated that the Act’s objective was to create
a clean election system that functioned to limit the influence of
special interest money in elections.63 The dissent also noted that
Arizona’s history of corruption and the infamous AzScam scandal
indicated that Arizona had a valid anticorruption rationale.64 Since
the matching funds provision, as the “Goldilocks solution,” was
integral to the effectiveness of Arizona’s pubic-financing program,
the dissent attributed the state’s anticorruption rationale to that
provision as much as it did to the entire program.65
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for characterizing
Arizona’s real purpose in creating the provision as “‘level[ing] the
playing field,’ not fighting corruption.”66 The dissent noted that the
majority failed to present convincing evidence that the state’s interest
was anything other than fighting corruption.67 Further, the dissent
asserted that even if Arizona had sought to level the electoral playing
field, as long as the state had a compelling interest—such as
anticorruption—any separate interest in leveling the playing field
would be irrelevant.68 Thus, the dissent would have upheld the
matching funds provision as constitutional.69
IV. ANALYSIS
This Comment argues that the Arizona Free Enterprise
majority’s disregard of empirical evidence, informal narrowing of
acceptable compelling state interests, and prioritization of individual
speech over societal interests might well lead to campaign-finance
deregulation and yield unprincipled court decisions. This Comment

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 2841.
Id.
Id. at 2841–42.
Id. at 2842.
Id. at 2842–43.
Id. at 2843.
Id. at 2844.
Id. at 2844–45.
Id.
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also asserts that this decision’s myopic analytic approach risks the
piecemeal invalidation of intricate public-financing schemes and
adversely impacts policy decisions.
A. Empiricism Does Matter and Should
Not Be Unjustifiably Downplayed
Arizona Free Enterprise sets problematic precedent in its
disregard of empirical evidence. In the field of election law,
empiricism matters and should not be unjustifiably downplayed. Its
importance is especially acute in regard to campaign-finance-reform
efforts, which not only contain elements of democratic theory, law,
and public policy but also depend on empirical political science.70 If
legislators and policy makers rely on empirical facts to draft laws
like Arizona’s, then courts should also consider such evidence before
they make their decisions.
Despite the importance of empiricism in this field, the Arizona
Free Enterprise majority offered little empirical evidence to support
its reasoning.71 For example, in regard to whether the matching funds
provision burdened political speech, the majority was satisfied that
“it is never easy to prove a negative.”72 More telling, the majority
explicitly stated that “we do not need empirical evidence to
determine that the law at issue is burdensome.”73
In contrast to the majority’s highly abstract discussion, the
dissent and the Ninth Circuit more fully engaged the empirical
evidence. For instance, in finding that the matching funds provision
did not impose a burden on speech, the dissent relied on several
statistics that showed that expenditures by candidates and
independent groups increased since the public financing law was
enacted.74
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize “mere
metaphysical threats to political speech as severe burdens” and
required the plaintiffs to prove that the specter of matching funds

70. Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s Perspective, 32 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1105, 1119 (1999).
71. The majority simply cited several plaintiffs’ petitions for certiorari, in which they
attested that the Act burdened their speech. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2822.
72. Id. at 2823 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2834 n.2 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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actually chilled their speech.75 The Ninth Circuit noted, “No
Plaintiff . . . has pointed to any specific instance in which she or he
has declined a contribution or failed to make an expenditure for fear
of triggering matching funds.”76 Rather, even though he claimed that
the Act burdened his political speech, one privately financed
candidate could not recall whether his spending had ever triggered a
state’s grant of matching funds to an opponent; another privately
financed candidate instructed his campaign consultant to fundraise as
much as possible without mentioning concerns of triggering
matching funds.77
Aside from its importance to the issue of burdening speech,
empiricism is also pivotal to a court’s inquiry into a compelling state
interest.78 Although political scientists have not been able to prove
conclusively the seemingly obvious fact that money corrupts,79 the
evidence in Arizona Free Enterprise surely established that
Arizona’s public funding law was aimed at combating political
corruption that was caused by campaign contributions.80 While the
majority quickly dismissed evidence of Arizona’s anticorruption
rationale, the dissent, like the Ninth Circuit, acknowledged that
empirical evidence and recognized that Arizona passed the Act in
response to AzScam.81 Ironically, if the majority had been more
inclined to consider Arizona’s anticorruption rationale, proof of
Arizona’s need to combat corruption was literally staring it in the
face: Arizona senator and key plaintiff in Arizona Free Enterprise
John McComish, who just that week admitted to being embroiled in
a campaign-finance scandal, was present in the courtroom during
oral arguments.82

75. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 522–23 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
76. Id. at 523.
77. Id. at 524.
78. Cain, supra note 70, at 1114–15 (“Defining important state purposes is both a normative
and an empirical task.”).
79. Id. at 1115.
80. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2832 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
81. Id.; McComish, 611 F.3d at 514, 525; see supra Part III.B.
82. Doug Kendall, McComish, the Supreme Court and the Fiesta Bowl Scandal, HUFFPOST
POLITICS (Apr. 4, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-kendall/mccomish-thesupreme-cour_b_844728.html.
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Overall, the majority’s disregard for empirical evidence not only
resulted in an unprincipled83 decision in Arizona Free Enterprise but
also set a worrisome precedent for future campaign-finance cases.
Arizona Free Enterprise represents the second wave of Supreme
Court campaign-finance cases that have disregarded empirical
evidence. The first wave came with what one scholar has called the
“New Deference Quartet”—four campaign-finance cases in the early
2000s in which the Court only casually considered empirical
evidence.84 Scholars have criticized those decisions as unprincipled
because the Court only paid lip service to satisfying a “quantum of
empirical evidence.”85 But the Arizona Free Enterprise decision is
arguably even more unprincipled for its outright statement that
empirical evidence is unnecessary.
So why did the Arizona Free Enterprise majority perpetuate a
disregard for empirical evidence? At least two reasons present
themselves. The cynical view is that the Justices use evidence merely
to buttress their “simple value judgments . . . on the wisdom of
particular campaign finance laws.”86 Another view is that the Court
may treat evidence somewhat superficially because it has lost faith in
the kinds of questions that the existing doctrine makes relevant.87 But
whatever the majority’s reason was for disregarding empirical
evidence, its decision to do so caused Arizona Free Enterprise to be
an unprincipled decision and a problematic precedent.
B. The Decision Reflects the Roberts Court’s
Trend of Narrowing the Acceptable Compelling
State Interests in Campaign-Finance Cases
Another troubling aspect of Arizona Free Enterprise is the
majority’s implicit narrowing of the acceptable compelling state
interests in campaign finance cases. By way of background, in the
seminal campaign finance case Buckley, the Court held that
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, unlike
83. The decision is “unprincipled” in the sense that it is not anchored to the real world and
can lead a court to implement judicial discretion that is not grounded in fact or law.
84. Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C.
L. REV. 669, 674–75 (2006).
85. See, e.g., id.
86. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Empirics of Campaign Finance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 944–45
(2005).
87. Id. at 945.
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leveling the electoral playing field, is a compelling state interest that
justifies an infringement on First Amendment rights.88 However,
while the Justices in Buckley considered corruption in terms of a quid
pro quo (money for political favors), the word “corruption” itself is
pliable and susceptible to many meanings.89 The Court took
advantage of this pliability in the “New Deference Quartet” cases,
which expanded the definitions of “corruption” and “the appearance
of corruption” beyond the quid pro quo variety and into the territory
of more subtle favoritism and undue influence.90 In Davis, the Court
halted this trend that embraced a broader view of corruption and
reverted to the Buckley conception of corruption.91 More recently, in
Citizens United v. FEC,92 the Court clearly circumscribed the
anticorruption interest, strictly limiting it to the threat of actual quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.93
Given this background, Arizona Free Enterprise was seemingly
yet another instance where the Court restricted the government’s
anticorruption rationale. There, the majority suggested that
anticorruption needs should be the major reason, if not the only
reason, behind a campaign-finance regulation, lest that rationale is
perceived as illusory.94 Specifically, because the majority discerned
that one reason behind Arizona’s public-funding law may have been
to “level the playing field,” it held that the state’s anticorruption
rationale was illusory and merely a front for a constitutionally
impermissible reason.95 As the dissent indicated, however, campaign
finance jurisprudence has never required that anticorruption be the
state’s only interest; as long as preventing corruption or the

88. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–29 (1976).
89. Jason S. Campbell, Note, Down the Rabbit Hole with Citizens United: Are Bans on
Corporate Direct Campaign Contributions Still Constitutional?, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 171, 195
(2011).
90. Hasen, supra note 84, at 674–75 (referencing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Commission, 533 U.S. 431 (2001), and Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000)).
91. Emily C. Schuman, Comment, Davis v. Federal Election Commission: Muddying the
Clean Money Landscape, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 737, 753–54 (2009).
92. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
93. Campbell, supra note 89, at 196; see also Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption,
124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 125–26 (2010).
94. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825
(2011).
95. Id.
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appearance of corruption is one valid rationale behind a law, it does
not matter that another rationale may be an insufficient interest.96
Despite the dissent’s protest, the majority opinion is binding on
lower courts. Thus, courts can now more easily strike down
campaign-finance regulations where combating corruption is not the
sole rationale and where additional impermissible rationales also
motivate the law. The ease with which post-Arizona Free Enterprise
courts can invalidate campaign-finance laws for lack of a “nonillusory” compelling state interest aligns well with Chief Justice
Roberts’s political philosophy. According to the Chief Justice, who
wrote the majority’s opinion, “the political process itself [is] an
adequate remedy for corruption.”97 Because of Roberts’s belief in the
self-regulation of the political process, the anticorruption rationale
will likely continue to become an impotent compelling state interest
during his tenure on the Court. Given its ongoing circumscription of
the anticorruption rationale from Davis to Citizens United to Arizona
Free Enterprise, it is conceivable that the Court will continue to limit
the rationale to the extent that it supports a burden on First
Amendment rights in only extremely narrow circumstances. The
narrowing trend already means that future campaign-finance laws
will have more difficulty in passing constitutional muster, and it may
also lead to increased deregulation of campaign finance.
C. Prioritizing Individual Speech over Societal Interests Is
Inconsistent with First Amendment Principles
The Court’s balancing of First Amendment rights is also
troubling. The Arizona Free Enterprise majority focused on how the
Arizona law burdened the speech of individual candidates and
independent expenditure groups without considering the
countervailing First Amendment rights of society at large. This
prioritization of individual speech over societal interests can yield
nearsighted decisions in future campaign-finance jurisprudence and
lead to campaign-finance deregulation.

96. Id. at 2844–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97. Rachel Gage, Note, Randall v. Sorrell: Campaign-Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment as a Facilitator of Democracy, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 341, 368 (2007).
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The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was drafted to
foster democratic self-government, among other reasons.98 Buckley
recognized this societal aspect of the First Amendment by
prescribing an “electorate-centered” analytical approach whereby
“the relationship between First Amendment rights and campaign
finance should be structured in a way that best serves the
electorate.”99 The Buckley approach provided a critical foundation
for upholding public funding regulations because those regulations
often restrict an individual candidate while they benefit the public.100
As one commentator has noted, Davis marked a paradigm shift
“away from the interests of the voting public and toward individual
candidates.”101 By adopting a “candidate-centered” interpretation of
First Amendment interests in the campaign-finance context, Davis
prioritized individual speech over societal interests.102 As a case that
heavily relied on Davis, Arizona Free Enterprise’s prioritization of
individual speech over societal interests was not surprising.
Critics of the First Amendment as protector of societal interests
have asserted that:
If the First Amendment can require restrictions on
individual speech in order to protect democracy-facilitating
speech-in-the-aggregate, it is left to the courts to decide the
point at which the restriction on the individual fails to serve
society’s interests, and also to determine when an individual
deserves protection despite the fact that such protection may
be at odds with democratic self-governance.103
Essentially, these critics claim that an individual-centered First
Amendment approach is correct simply because it is more
straightforward.104 However inconvenient it may be to consider
countervailing societal interests in a First Amendment analysis, such
interests are an integral part of the First Amendment and should
therefore have a place in the burden calculus. By adopting the Davis
98. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2366 (2000).
99. Schuman, supra note 91, at 741.
100. Id.; see also Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 119 (“[The] restrictive aspect of the [campaign
finance] reform agenda is ultimately both its strength and its constitutional liability.”).
101. Schuman, supra note 91, at 741.
102. Id. at 741–42.
103. Gage, supra note 97, at 363–64.
104. Id. at 364–65.
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candidate-centered view of the First Amendment, Arizona Free
Enterprise put a stamp of approval on subverting societal First
Amendment interests and thus endangered the viability of future
public-funding schemes.
D. A Myopic Approach Can Result
in Undesirable Repercussions
The Court’s myopic approach toward invalidating the matching
funds provision represents another fundamental reason that Arizona
Free Enterprise is a disconcerting decision. Whereas the dissent took
a holistic approach to analyzing the matching funds provision by
recognizing that the provision was integral to the effectiveness of
Arizona’s entire public-financing program,105 the majority took a
myopic approach by isolating that provision and analyzing it in a
vacuum.106
The majority’s shortsighted approach has at least two possible
repercussions. First, it undermines entire campaign-finance schemes
in Arizona, and by application, elsewhere. Arizona Free Enterprise is
significant in that it represents a problematic piecemeal approach to
invalidating an intricate public financing scheme. Although the
effects of disturbing one part of a multifaceted law cannot be known
with certainty,107 the Court’s disturbing of Arizona’s matching funds
provision likely undercuts the state’s entire scheme because the
provision was “one component that [was] not only attractive but
necessary to make this type of funding work.”108 Tellingly, at oral
arguments, Justice Breyer lamented that “it is better to say that it’s
all illegal than to subject these things to death by a thousand cuts,
because we don’t know what will happen when we start tinkering
with one provision rather than another.”109 In this manner, Justice

105. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2842–43
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., id. at 2818 (majority opinion).
107. See also Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2011) (noting that by constantly leaving only half of campaign
finance programs intact, the Court has rendered those regulations ineffective). See generally
Michael A. Fitts, The Hazards of Legal Fine Tuning: Confronting the Free Will Problem in
Election Law Scholarship, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1999) (noting how it is difficult to predict
the impact of legal changes).
108. Schuman, supra note 91, at 740.
109. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: Kennedy Shows His Hand, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28,
2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=116863.
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Breyer, as a member of the dissent, stressed that deviating from a
holistic approach to analyzing such public-financing laws can have
unintended consequences.
Arizona Free Enterprise also has far-reaching implications for
local and national policy decisions. The Court’s decision facilitates
the ability of other courts to strike down laws that are aimed at both
curbing political candidates’ dependence on outside money and the
concomitant threat of corruption. As access to elected officials is
increasingly linked to wealth, the more likely it is that the civil rights
of the poor and minorities will be neglected.110 This, in turn, has the
effect of diminishing the public’s confidence in our democracy and
of increasing its concerns about special interests.111 Indeed,
following 2010’s controversial Citizens United ruling, which cleared
the way for unlimited spending by corporations in federal elections,
public concerns about special interests is already high.112
V. CONCLUSION
Arizona Free Enterprise’s disregard for empirical evidence,
informal narrowing of the acceptable compelling state interests,
prioritization of individual speech over societal interests, and myopic
analytical approach endanger campaign-finance regulations and
could lead to unprincipled decisions in future campaign-finance
cases. If this case is any indicator of the future of campaign-finance
reform, money talks—and it will have troubling things to say.

110. Brief of Amicus Curiae Union for Reform Judaism in Support of Respondents, supra
note 6, at 14.
111. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
112. Denniston, supra note 109.

